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Figueroa: Federal Conviction for Offense Not Constituting Felony under Texa

CRIMINAL LAW-Sentencing-Federal Conviction for Offense
Not Constituting Felony Under Texas Law May be Used to
Enhance Punishment Under Section 12.42 of Texas Penal
Code When Federal Conviction is Punishable by Possible
Confinement in Prison.
Ex parte Blume,
618 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
In August 1978, Lynn Dale Blume was convicted of felony possession of
marihuana.' His punishment was enhanced from a third degree felony to
a second degree felony on the basis of a prior felony conviction in federal
court.' Blume applied to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ
of habeas corpus alleging that his prior federal conviction was not a felony offense under Texas law, thus it could not be used to enhance his
punishment.' The court of criminal appeals remanded Blume's application to the trial court for determination of whether his federal conviction
was, in fact, used to enhance his punishment.' The trial court found the
federal conviction had been used to enhance Blume's punishment, and
recommended that his punishment be set aside because the prior federal
conviction was not a felony under Texas law.' Held-Relief denied. A
federal conviction for an offense not constituting a felony under Texas
law may be used to enhance punishment under section 12.42 of the Texas
Penal Code when the federal conviction is punishable by possible confinement in prison.6
1. Ex parte Blume 618 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
2. See id. at 374. The statute under which Blume's punishment was enhanced provides
for enhancement from a third-degree felony to a second-degree felony for a defendant who
is convicted of a third-degree felony and who has previously been convicted of any felony.
See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(a) (Vernon 1974). A defendant convicted of a thirddegree felony may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, while a
defendant convicted of a second-degree felony may be sentenced to a maximum term of 20
years. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.34, 12.33 (Vernon 1974). Blume was convicted under
a federal statute which prohibited the receiving or selling of stolen vehicles. See Ex parte
Blume, 618 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); 18 U.S.C. § 2313 (1976). The violation
of this federal statute carried a possible punishment of up to five years in the penitentiary.
See 18 U.S.C §§ 2313, 4083 (1976).
3. See Ex parte Blume, 618 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
4. Ex porte Blume, 607 S.W.2d 924, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en banc).
5. Ex parte Blume, 618 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
6. Id. at 374.
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All states, through laws enacted by their legislatures, have the power to

define crimes and set punishments.7 Further, state legislatures may promulgate laws which provide enhanced penalties for those who are habitual criminals.' Recidivist statutes,s found in a majority of jurisdictions,1

provide harsher punishment for those who, by their continued or repeated criminal conduct, show that they cannot conform to the laws of
1
the state.1" Most recidivist statutes have been held to be constitutional. '
7. See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 375 (1958); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 168 (1952); Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 18 (1852). See generally 12 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 525, 526 (1980). The power of the state to punish those who disregard its laws is
said to arise from the state's inherent police power to protect the public's "health, safety,
and morals." See generally W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 117

(1972).
8. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 268 (1980); Puckett v. Ellis, 157 F. Supp. 923,
926 (E.D. Tex. 1958); Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BUrFALO L.
REV. 99, 104 (1971); Note, Habitual Criminal Statute 12:42(d)-Open Door To Disproportionate Sentences, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 629, 629 (1977); Note, Recidivist Laws Under The
Eighth Amendment-Rummel v. Estelle, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 606, 609 (1979).
9. See People v. Rave, 3 N.E.2d 972, 976 (Il1. 1936). A recidivist is a habitual or incorrigible criminal. Id. at 976.
10. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-9 to 5-10 (1977 & 1981 Supp.); ALASKA STAT. § 17-10-200
(1975); ARuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-604 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1001 to -1005 (1977);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-101 (Supp. 1980); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-40 (West Supp. 1981); DEn.. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4214-4215 (1979);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084 (West 1976 & Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 27.2511 (1978);
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 706-661 to -662 (1976 & Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 19-2514 (1979); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 33A-3 (Smith-Hurd 1981 Supp.); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (Burns
Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.8 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504 (Supp. 1980);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 532.080 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (West 1981); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 643B (Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 25 (Michie/Law. Co-op
1980); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.1082, 28.1083 (Callaghan 1978 & Supp. 1981-1982); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 609.15 (West 1964); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-19-81 to -83 (1981 Supp.); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 558.016 (Vernon Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 95-1507 (Supp. 1977); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-2221 to 2222 (1979); NEv. REV. STAT. § 207.010 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 651:6 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:85-12 to -13 (West 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-5
(1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.06 to .10 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
14-7.1 to 14-7.6 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (1976 & Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 51-54 (West 1958 & Supp. 1981-1982); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 161.725, 161.735
(1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-553.1 (1962); S.D. CODiFID
LAWS ANN. §§ 22-7-7 to -12 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2801 to -2806 (1975); Tax. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 12.42 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-8-1001 to -1002 (1978); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 11 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.090 (1977); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-11-18
to -19 (1977); WiS. STAT. § 939.62 (West 1958 & Supp. 1981); WYO. STAT. §§ 6-1-109 to -111
(1977). There is also a federal habitual criminal statute. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-3576 (1976).
11. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980); Linley v. State, 501 S.W.2d
121, 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Mullins v. State, 409 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Tex. Crim. App.
1966). See generally Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BuFFALO L.
REV. 99, 104 (1971); Note, Habitual Criminal Statute 12.42(d) - Open Door To Disproportionate Sentences, 29 BAYLOR L. Rv. 629, 629 (1977); Note, Disproportionality In
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Recidivist statutes are only invoked against defendants who have been
previously convicted of a felony offense.18 Such statutes do not create a
new offense, but rather enhance a defendant's punishment upon a subsequent conviction.14 When prior convictions are to be used to enhance a
defendant's punishment it must be shown that each succeeding crime was
committed subsequent to the prior convictions becoming final.15 The
prior conviction must also be valid.1 6 Additionally, recidivist statutes
Sentences Of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1119, 1163 (1979); 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 526,
529 (1980). One of the objectives of the Texas Penal Code is to prevent recidivism. See Tax.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.02(1)(C) (Vernon 1974).
12. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980) (mandatory life imprisonment
under Texas recidivist statute not cruel and unusual punishment); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (recidivist statute not violative of due process); Spencer v. Texas,
385 U.S. 554, 559-560 (1967) (recidivist statute not violative of ban on double jeopardy). See
generally Note, DisproportionalityIn Sentences Of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. RE. 1119,
1162 (1979). One court, however, overturned a life sentence imposed under a recidivist statute because it constituted cruel and unusual punishment, thereby violating the eighth
amendment. See Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 143 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
938, 938 (1974).
13. See Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (Vernon 1974). The Texas recidivist statute is
invoked upon conviction of a second felony. Id. California's recidivist statute is applied
upon conviction of a second or subsequent violent felony. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
667.5(a)(b) (Deering Supp. 1981). New York's habitual criminal statute is available upon
conviction for a second felony, two or more felonies, and two or more violent felonies. See
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06, 70.08, 70.10 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1980-81).
14. See Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 7 (1954) (recidivist statute only imposes harsher
punishment for second offense); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 312 (1901) (statute imposes heavier penalty on those found habitual criminals); Porier v. State, 591 S.W.2d
482, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (Texas recidivist statute inflicts harsher punishment for
repeated criminal conduct); Ez parte Davis, 412 S.W.2d 46, 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (creates no offense, merely provides increased punishment on subsequent convictions); Mullins
v. State, 409 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (recidivist statute enhances punishment, it does not create a new offense).
15. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 449 S.W.2d 279, 281-82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (enhancement disallowed where no finding that second conviction occurred after first); Wheat
v. State, 442 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (enhancement proper where second
conviction occurred after first as to both time of commission and conviction); Haines v.
State, 391 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) (no evidence that second conviction was
committed after first conviction). Only a prior conviction which is final may be used to
enhance punishment. See, e.g., Davis v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 1976) (probated
or suspended sentence not final conviction for enhancement purposes); Mays v. Estelle, 505
F.2d 116, 117 (5th Cir. 1974) (probated sentence not final conviction under Texas enhancement statute); Aaron v. State, 546 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (use of conviction
not yet final precluded at punishment phase of trial).
16. See, e.g., Martinez v. Estelle, 612 F.2d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1980) (prior conviction
resulting from tricked confession may not be used to enhance punishment); Ex parte Stewart, 582 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (conviction based on fatally defective indictment not available to enhance sentence); Ex parte Rogers, 519 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1975) (enhanced sentence of life imprisonment overturned when prior conviction
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must be strictly construed."7
Courts are in disagreement whether a conviction in another jurisdiction
may be used for enhancement purposes where the foreign conviction is
not defined as a felony in the forum state. 18 Some courts have held that in
order to utilize a prior felony conviction in another jurisdiction the foreign offense must be one which constitutes a felony in the state seeking
enhancement. 19 Other courts have ruled that the prior conviction need
invalid).
17. See, e.g., Puckett v. Ellis, 157 F. Supp. 923, 926 (E.D. Tex. 1958) (Texas recidivist
statute strictly construed); Tyra v. State, 534 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (habitual criminal statute strictly construed); Garcia v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 340, 343-44, 145
S.W.2d 180, 181 (1940) (since habitual criminal statutes are harsh, strict construction required). But see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.05(a) (Vernon 1974). Section 1.05 abolished the
common law rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused, and
states that provisions of the code are to be interpreted "according to the fair import of their
.terms, to promote justice and effect the objectives of the code." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
1.05(a) (Vernon 1974); Bubany, The Texas Penal Code of 1974, 28 SW. L.J. 292, 294-95
(1975). The court of criminal appeals has not expressly abolished the rule of strict construction. See Searcy & Patterson, Commentary on The Penalties For Repeat and Habitual
Offenders, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 26 (Vernon 1974). The court has, however, cited section
1.05 (a) without discussion. See Ex parte Mercado, 590 S.W.2d 464, 465 (Tex. Crim, App.
1979); Ahearn v. State, 588 S.W.2d 327, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). Citing section 1.05 (a),
a recent dissenting opinion stated that the language of the code is to be interpreted according to the "fair import" of their terms. See Johnson v. State, 606 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980) (Clinton, J., dissenting). The objectives of the Texas Penal Code are, inter
alia, to deter criminal activity, to rehabilitate those convicted of crimes, to prevent recidivism, to give fair warning of what is deemed criminal and the punishment therefor, to provide sentences proportionate to the crime, and to protect conduct that is blameless. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.02 (Vernon 1974). Compare Puckett v. Ellis, 157 F. Supp. 923,
926 (E.D. Tex. 1958) (Texas recidivist statute strictly construed) and Tyra v. State, 534
S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (habitual criminal statute strictly construed) with
U.S. v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 996 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying federal law) (strict construction
doctrine not absolute, legislative intent governs) and Faulk v. State, 608 S.W.2d 625, 631
(Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (en banc) ("rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain legislative
intent in enacting statute by looking at language of statute itself").
18. Compare Tyrell v. Crouse, 422 F.2d 852, 853 (10th Cir. 1970) (sufficient that prior
conviction was felony in convicting state) and People v. Swain, 607 P.2d 396, 397-98 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1979) (no need for proof that out-of-state conviction would have been felony if
committed in state) with State v. Silas, 589 P.2d 674, 675 (N.M. 1979) (conviction in another jurisdiction not felony under New Mexico law would not support enhanced sentence)
and Clonce v. State, 588 P.2d 584, 591-92 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (for purposes of enhancement prior conviction in foreign jurisdiction must be denominated as penitentiary offense
under Oklahoma law).
19. See, e.g., State v. McMillian, 587 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (prior conviction of auto theft in Illinois properly used to enhance defendant's punishment where
same act would have been felony in Missouri); State v. Silas, 589 P.2d 674, 675 (N.M. 1979)
(conviction in another jurisdiction not felony under New Mexico law would not support
enhanced sentence); Clonce v. State, 588 P.2d 584, 591-92 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (conviction in another jurisdiction can be used to enhance punishment under recidivist statute if
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only be denominated as a felony in the jurisdiction which tried the prior
conviction."0
Construing the former Texas Penal Code,21 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Garcia v. States2 held a prior felony conviction in another
jurisdiction could not be used for enhancement where the foreign offense
was not one which was denounced as a felony by the laws of Texas.s The
Garcia court partially based its decision on the legislature's failure to expressly provide for the use of prior felony convictions rendered by other
jurisdictions in the enhancement statute. 4 The Texas legislature signifi-

foreign offense would be penitentiary offense under Oklahoma law).
20. See, e.g., Tyrell v. Crouse, 422 F.2d 852, 853 (10th Cir. 1970) (sufficient that prior
conviction was felony in convicting state); People v. Swain, 607 P.2d 396, 397-98 (Colo. Ct
App. 1979) (no need for proof that out-of-state conviction would have been felony if committed in state); State.v. Prince, 132 P.2d 146, 149 (Idaho 1942) (prior felony conviction in
sister state need not be felony in forum state). Because of the lack of uniformity among
jurisdictions as to whether a foreign offense must also be a felony under the laws of the
forum state, it is helpful to look at the wording of their habitual criminal statutes. Compare
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-101 (1978 & Supp. 1980) (prior conviction "either in this state or
elsewhere of a felony, or under the laws of any other state .. . of a crime which if committed within this state would be a felony"); and IDAHO CODE § 19-2514 (1979) (prior conviction
"whether ... had within the state of Idaho or was had without the state of Idaho") with
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-5 (1972) (prior conviction "within this state of a felony, or ...
under the laws of any other state or ... government ... of a crime ... which if committed

within this state would be a felony") and OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 21, § 54 (West 1958 & Supp.
1980-81) ("convicted in any other state ... of an offense which, if committed within this
state, would be punishable by the laws of this state by imprisonment in the penitentiary").
It should be noted that the language of the Oklahoma statute is contained in a separate
provision within the habitual criminal section which specifically deals with prior convictions
in other jurisdictions. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 54 (West 1958 & Supp. i980-1981).
21. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 62 (1925) (provided for enhancement if the defendant was convicted of the same offense or one of a similar nature). The definition of a felony
under the old penal code provided that a felony was an "offense ... to which is annexed, on
conviction, any punishment prescribed in this code." See Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 47
(1925).
22. 140 Tex. Crim. 340, 145 S.W.2d 180 (1940).
23. See id. at 343, 145 S.W.2d at 182; see also Puckett v. Ellis, 157 F. Supp. 923, 927
(E.D. Tex. 1958) (prior federal conviction must constitute felony under Texas law); Ex
parte Scafe, 334 S.W.2d 170, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960) (federal conviction for transporting
rubber stamp not offense under Texas law); Clark v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 581, 582-83, 230
S.W.2d 234, 235-36 (1950) (federal conviction of conspiracy to illegally possess explosives
not crime under Texas law). The court in Garcia relied on the dictum in one of itsprior
decisions. See Garcia v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 340, 342-43, 145 S.W.2d 180, 181 (1940). The
case which the court relied on was Arnold v. State, 127 Tex. Crim. 89, 74 S.W.2d 997 (1934).
In Arnold, the court rejected a defendant's argument that his punishment could not be
enhanced under article 63 because one of his prior convictions was a federal offense. See
Arnold v. State, 127 Tex. Crim. 89, 94, 74 S.W.2d 997, 999 (1934).
24. See Garcia v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 340, 344, 145 S.W.2d 180, 181-82 (1940). The
court noted the legislature could have used the words "in this or any other state" so that
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cantly changed the language of Texas' enhancement statute when it enacted the present penal code in 1974.'5 Under article 62 of the old Penal
Code a prior conviction could be used to enhance a defendant's punishment if it could be shown that the prior offense was of the same nature as
the instant offense.2e Subsections (a) through (c) of section 12.42 of the
new Penal Code, which replaced article 62, however, contain no such limitation.2 7 Furthermore, the definition of felony in the new Penal Code differs from its predecessor in that the new Penal Code does not mention
the punishment provided for in the code.28 Additionally, section 12.41
classifies, for enhancement purposes, those convictions obtained outside

there would be no doubt that a prior felony conviction in another state could be used for
enhancement though not a felony under Texas law. See id. at 344, 145 S.W.2d at 182. The
court also reasoned that because enhancement statutes are harsh they are to be strictly
construed. See id. at 343-44, 145 S.W.2d at 181. Finally, the court concluded that the legislature's failure to act after the Arnold decision constituted an endorsement of the court's
construction of the statute. See id. at 344, 145 S.W.2d at 182; see also Ex parte Boehme,
158 Tex. Crim. 278, 288-89, 255 S.W.2d 206, 213 (1952) (Morrison, J., concurring) (leglislature met several times since decision was rendered and did not change or amend statute);
Lockhart v. State, 150 Tex. Crim. 230, 235, 200 S.W.2d 164, 167-68 (1947) (on motion for
rehearing) (legislature met many times after statute was construed and failed to amend,
therefore, construction of statute by court was interpretation intended by legislature); Francis v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 67, 73-74, 233 S.W. 974, 977 (1921) (when statute is revised
without change presumption arises that legislature intended prior construction to govern).
Legislative acquiescence alone will not preclude the court from reconsidering a prior decision. See Shivers v. State, 574 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (Dally, J., concurring). The United States Supreme Court has said, "It is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law." Girouard v. United States,
328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946); accord Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S.
235, 241 (1970).
25. See Searcy & Patterson, PracticeCommentary, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. 413 (Vernon
1974). The practice commentary to section 12.42 states that subsections (a) through (c) of
section 12.42 preserved prior article 62, except that under the new section the court is given
more discretion as to the length of sentence it may impose upon habitual offenders, and
there is no longer a requirement that the offense for which the defendant is on trial be of
the same nature as the prior offense. See id.
26. See, e.g., King v. State, 519 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (offenses must
be similar); Doby v. State, 454 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (prior convictions
not available to enhance punishment when not similar to instant offense); Cherry v. State,
447 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (prior conviction must be of same nature as
primary offense).
27. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (Vernon 1974). For example, subsection (a) of
section 12.42 reads, in part, as follows: "If... defendant has been once before convicted of
any felony ...... Id. § 12.42(a).
28. Compare 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 104 § 1, at 82 (felony is "offense ... to which is
annexed, on conviction, any punishment prescribed in this code" and "may... be punishable by death or by confinement in the penitentiary") with TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §
1.07(a)(14) (Vernon 1974) ("felony means offense so designated by law or punishable by
death or confinement in a penitentiary").
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the code, including convictions obtained in other jurisdictions.2 ' Although
the revised Penal Code altered the language of the enhancement statute,
the court of criminal appeals continued to follow Garcia.30
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in Ex parte Blume,"' held a federal conviction for an offense which does not constitute a felony under
Texas law may be used to enhance punishment under section 12.42(a) of
the Texas Penal Code when the federal conviction is punishable by possible confinement in a penitentiary. 3 The court expressly overruled earlier
decisions which adhered to the rule established in Garcia,s8 reasoning
they neglected to discuss the effects of the new Penal Code on the Garcia
rule." The majority relied upon a literal reading of the enhancement stat3
ute in conjunction with other pertinent provisions of the Penal Code. It
stressed the significance of the inclusion of section 12.41 which classifies,
for purposes of enhanced sentencing under section 12.42, convictions ob-

29. See Betancourt v. State, 590 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); TEX. PENAL
§ 12.41 (Vernon 1974). Section 12.41 provides that convictions under the former
code, or convictions in foreign jurisdictions, shall be considered felonies of the third degree,
if a prison term could possibly be assessed. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.41(1) (Vernon
1974).
30. See Montgomery v. State, 571 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Ex parte
Smith, 548 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). In Montgomery, the court of criminal
appeals held a federal offense of making a false and fictitious statement to a licensed firearms dealer was not an offense under Texas law and, therefore, could not be used to enhance a defendant's punishment. See Montgomery v. State. 571 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978). The court, in Montgomery, simply cited prior case law construing the enhancement statute in the former Penal Code as controlling without discussing the effect of the
new Penal Code. See id. at 19; see also Ex parte Smith, 548 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977).
31. 618 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
32. See id. at 374.
33. See Montgomery v. State, 571 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Ex parte
Smith, 548 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Garcia v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 340,
344, 145 S.W.2d 180, 182 (1940).
34. See Ex parte Blume, 618 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); see also Montgomery v. State, 571 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Ex parte Smith, 548 S.W.2d 410,
412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Garcia v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 340, 344, 145 S.W.2d 180, 182
(1940). The majority in Blume noted that because the court in Garcia was without statutory
guidance it was forced to rely on the dictum in Arnold. See Ex parte Blume, 618 S.W.2d
373, 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); see also Garcia v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 340, 342-43, 145
S.W.2d 180, 181 (1940); cf. Arnold v. State, 127 Tex. Crim. 89, 94, 74 S.W.2d 997, 999
(1934).
35. See Ex parte Blume, 618 S.W.2d 373, 375-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). More specifically, the court compared the wording of the enhancement statute and the definition of a
felony as it appeared in the old Penal Code with that in the new Penal Code. See id. at 37576. The court noted that former articles 62 and 63 used the term "a felony", whereas section
12.42 used the term "any felony". See id. at 374-76. The court also contrasted the definitions of felony as contained in both the old and new Penal Codes. See id. at 374-76.
CODE ANN.
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tained in foreign jurisdictions.3 Contrasting the former Penal Code with
the new one, the court stated that the obvious intention of the legislature
was to make convictions for felonies in other jurisdictions available for
enhancement purposes.8 7 Judge Clinton, in his concurring opinion, agreed
with the result reached by the court, inasmuch as the Texas Legislature
had clearly expressed its intention to change prior case law concerning
enhancement.38 He warned, however, that the court's decision could lead
to possible conflicts with public policy.39
In a strong dissent, Judge Teague argued that the court's decision in
Montgomery should have been followed on the ground of stare decisisY'
The dissent's argument centered on the Texas Legislature's failure to act
after the court's decision in Montgomery."1 By failing to act in 1978, the
legislature impliedly endorsed that decision.2 s Additionally, Judge Teague
stated that section 12.42 was simply a recodification of the former Penal
Code, and that the wording was changed because of the new categorization of felonies.'3 Judge Teague echoed Judge Clinton's assessment that
the court's decision could give rise to a possible conflict with the public
policy of the state of Texas." Finally, the dissent noted that the majority

seemed to have ignored8 the strict rule of construction generally applied to
enhancement statutes.

The holding in Blume is consistent with the import of the language in
the new enhancement statute. 6 The differences between the wording of

36. See id. at 376. Section 12.41 reads as follows: "For purposes of this chapter, any
conviction not obtained from a prosecution under this code shall be classified as follows: (1)
'felony of the third degree' if confinement in a penitentiary is affixed to the offense as a
possible punishment .....
" TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.41 (Vernon 1974).
37. See Ex parte Blume, 618 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
38. See id. at 377 (Clinton, J., concurring).
39. See id. at 377 (Clinton, J., concurring). Judge Clinton posed a hypothetical situation in which constitutional protections might be implicated. For example, a citizen of Texas
might have a prior felony conviction in a sister state for conducting a bingo game. In a
recent election the voters of the state of Texas empowered the legislature to authorize and
regulate bingo games. Under the court's decision in Blume this prior conviction could be
used to enhance punishment. See id. at 377 (Clinton, J., concurring).
40. See id. at 377 (Teague, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 377-78 (Teague, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 377-78 (Teague, J., dissenting).
43. See id. at 378 (Teague, J., dissenting).
44. See id. at 378 (Teague, J., dissenting).
45. See id. at 378 (Teague, J., dissenting).
46. See Faulk v. State, 608 S.W.2d 625, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) ("rule of statutory
interpretation is to ascertain legislative intent in enacting statute by looking at language of
statute itself."). The Texas Penal Code provides that the "code shall be construed according
to the fair import of their terms .... .. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.05(a) (Vernon
1974).
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the new enhancement statute and the former one are significant.4 7 Under
the old enhancement statute the prior conviction had to be the same as or
similar in nature to the primary offense. 6 On the other hand, section
12.42 of the new Penal Code provides that "any felony" may be used to
enhance a defendant's punishment; provided, however, the prior offense
carried as a possible punishment confinement in a penitentiary.'9 By rejecting the requirement under the old enhancement statute that the prior
conviction resemble the instant offense, the obvious intent of the legislature was to expand the scope of the enhancement statute to incorporate a
wider range of felonies.6 0 Although the definition of the term "felony" in
the former code and in our present Penal Code contain similar language, 1
the definition of felony in the former began by first defining the term
"offense" as an act "forbidden by positive law, and to which is annexed,
on conviction, any punishment prescribed in this code."6 Unlike article
47 of the former Penal Code, there is no language in the definition of
felony in the new Penal Code which limits the definition to punishments
provided for in the code. 8 Additionally, the present Penal Code contains
section 12.41 which specifically addresses the question of how felony convictions in other jurisdictions are to be treated for enhancement purposes." Section 12.41 classifies "for purposes of enhancement of punishment under section 12.42, those convictions obtained either under our

47. See Searcy & Patterson, PracticeCommentary, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. 413 (Vernon
1974).
48. See, e.g., King v. State, 519 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (offenses must
be similar); Doby v. State, 454 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (prior convictions
not available to enhance punishment when not similar to instant offense); Cherry v. State,
447 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (prior conviction must be of same nature as
primary offense).
49. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.41, .42 (Vernon 1974).
50. Compare Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 62 (1925) (prior conviction must be same as or
similar in nature to the instant offense) with TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (Vernon 1974)
(prior conviction of any felony).
51. Compare Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 47 (1925) with Tsx. PENAL CODE ANN. §
1.07(a)(14) (Vernon 1974).
52. Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 47 (1925). Unlike article 47, there is no definition of the
term "offense" in the new Penal Code. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07 (Vernon 1974).
The holding in Garcia was, therefore, consistent with the definition of the term offense in
the former code. See Garcia v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 340, 343, 145 S.W.2d 180, 182 (1940);
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 47 (1925).
53. See Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(14) (Vernon 1974). By their failure to incorporate such a limitation in the new Penal Code, it would seem that the legislature intended to
enlarge the ambit of the term felony. See Ex parte Blume, 618 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1981).
54. See Betancourt v. State, 590 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 942 (1979); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.41 (Vernon 1974).
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former Penal Code or under those Penal Codes of other jurisdictions." 5
Section 12.41 provides that convictions under the former code, or convictions in foreign jurisdictions, shall be considered felonies of the third degree if a prison term could possibly be assessed.56
The dissent's arguments opposing the holding in Blume are not well
reasoned. The contention that the legislature's inaction after the court's
decisions in Montgomery and Smith evidenced an intention that the legislature endorsed those decisions is unsound, inasmuch as mere inaction
on the part of the legislature should never be a controlling factor in determining legislative intent.5 7 Further, the dissent's reliance on Betancourt
v. State" is misplaced as that court clearly stated that section 12.41 of
the Penal Code classifies foreign convictions for purposes of enhancement."9 In addition, the argument that the court failed to recognize and
apply the well-established rule that recidivist statutes are to be strictly
construed is no longer valid." Section 1.05 of the Penal Code expressly
abolished the common law rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused, rather provisions of the code are to be

55. See Betancourt v. State, 590 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 942 (1979) The court, in Betancourt, also stated that "standing alone section 12.41
is only definitional, without any operative effect unless coupled with some subsection of
section 12.42 for penalty purposes." Id. at 489.
56. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.41(1) (Vernon 1974). There is at least one other
state which has a separate provision in its enhancement statute that classifies prior convictions in other jurisdictions. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 54 (West 1958 & Supp. 19801981). It is interesting to note that the Oklahoma statute explicitly states that before a prior
conviction in a sister state may be used to enhance a defendant's punishment it must be
shown that the prior offense would also be a felony in Oklahoma. See id.
57. See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241
(1970) (conclusive weight should not be given to Congress' failure to respond); Girouard v.
United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946) ("it is at best treacherous to find in congressional
silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law"); Shivers v. State, 574 S.W.2d 147,
150 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (Daily, J., concurring) (legislative inaction will not preclude a
court from re-examining a prior decision). Cases which have implied legislative endorsement
of court decisions due to legislative inaction are distinguishable from Ex parte Blume in
that, in those decisions, a considerable period of time had elapsed between cases, or the
statute in issue was merely a re-enactment of a prior statute. See Lockhart v. State, 150
Tex. Crim. 230, 235, 200 S.W.2d 164, 167-68 (1947) (on motion for rehearing); Francis v.
State, 90 Tex. Crim. 67, 73-74, 233 S.W. 974, 977 (1921). In Blume, however, the enhancement statute was not simply re-enacted, rather its language was significantly changed. See
Ex parte Blume, 618 S.W.2d 373, 374-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
58. 590 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 942 (1979).
59. See Ex parte Blume, 618 S.W.2d 373, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (Teague, J., dissenting); Betancourt v. State, 590 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 942 (1979).
60. See Ex parte Blume, 618 S.W.2d 373, 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (Teague, J.,
disssenting).
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interpreted "according to the fair import of their terms, to promote jus-

tice and effect the objectives of the code."'s

Under Blume, it is possibile for a defendant's punishment to be en-

hanced by a conviction for a crime which does not constitute an offense in
Texas.62 This result would be consistent with previous decisions in which
the court of criminal appeals has affirmed enhanced sentences of defendants whose prior convictions were felonies under the old Penal Code, but
merely misdemeanors under the present code. 68 Moreover, the determin-

61. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.05, 1.02 (Vernon 1974); Bubany, The Texas Penal
Code of 1974, 28 S.W. L.J. 292, 294-295 (1975). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
cited section 1.05 (a) without discussion. See Ex parte Mercado, 590 S.W.2d 464, 465 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979); Ahearn v. State, 588 S.W.2d 327, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). In discussing the purpose of the Texas recidivist statute the United States Supreme Court has said,
"Thus the interest of the State of Texas here is not simply that of making criminal the
unlawful acquisition of another person's property; it is an addition the interest, expressed in
all recidivist statutes, in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal
acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as
established by its criminal law." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 273, 276 (1980). The holding in
Blume, therefore, is consistent with the proposition that the overriding concern of a court
which is interpreting a statute is to give effect to the intention of the legislature. Compare
United States v. Sayklay, 542 F.2d 942, 944 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying federal law) (criminal
statutes are subject to strict construction) and Tyra v. State, 534 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1976) (habitual criminal statute strictly construed) with United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 996 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying federal law) (strict construction doctrine
not absolute, legislative intent governs) and Faulk v. State, 608 S.W.2d 625, 630 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980) (en banc) ("rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain legislative intent in
enacting statute by looking at language of statute itself"). Although the dissent argued that
the court should have adhered to the rule of stare decisis by reaffirming the decisions in
Montgomery and Smith, that rule is not absolute. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106,
119 (1940) ("stare decisis is principle of policy not mechanical formula of adherence to latest
decision . . . ")."The rule of stare decisis should control only if it makes sense or follows
logical reasoning." Middleton v. State, 476 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). See also
Shivers v. State, 574 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (Dally, J., concurring).
62. See Ex parte Blume, 618 S.W.2d 373, 377-78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (Teague, J.,
dissenting). Judge Teague, quoting Garcia, wrote "[I]nasmuch as each state has a criminal
code peculiar to itself, so that what may be regarded as an infamous crime in one state may
not be in another .... " See id. at 378. Judge Teague did not, however, specifically refer to
Judge Clinton's concurring opinion which seems to state the same proposition, but in a
different way. See id. at 377 (Clinton, J., concurring).
63. See Alvarado v. State, 596 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (prior felony
conviction under old Penal Code could be used to enhance defendant's punishment for burglary under new Penal Code, despite fact that prior offense no longer felony under new
code). The holding in Blume is consistent with the decision in Alvarado. Compare Alvarado
v. State, 596 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (prior felony conviction under old
Penal Code need not be felony under present Code) with Ex parte Blume, 618 S.W.2d 373,
374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (federal conviction for offense not constituting felony in Texas
may be used to enhance punishment under § 12.42 of Texas Penal Code when federal conviction punishable by possible confinement in penitentiary).
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ing factor under section 12.41 is whether the prior conviction was punishable by possible confinement in a penitentiary, not whether the prior conviction is one which is a felony under our present Penal Code. 4
Blume provided the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals with an opportunity to reassess its traditional stance on the issue of enhancement based
on prior convictions. In so doing, the court recognized that the obvious
differences in language between the former and present penal codes represented a deliberate attempt by the legislature to enhance the sentences
of repeat offenders, regardless of the nature of the offenders previous foreign conviction. The determinative issue under section 12.41 is simply
whether the prior conviction was punishable by incarceration. The code,
in light of Blume, may be construed to allow enhancement on the basis of
a conviction for conduct which is not prohibited by Texas law. Despite
the harshness of such an outcome, the majority in Blume declined to give
a strict reading of the statute in deference to the perceived will of the
legislature.
Leo D. Figueroa

64. See Betancourt v. State, 590 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 942 (1979); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.41 (Vernon 1974); Searcy & Patterson,
Practice Commentary, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 413 (Vernon 1974). The holding in Blume
follows other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Tyrrell v. Crouse, 422 F.2d 852, 853 (10th Cir. 1970)
(sufficient that prior conviction was felony in convicting state); People v. Swain, 607 P.2d
396, 397-98 (Colo. App. 1979) (no need for proof out-of-state conviction would have been
felony if committed in forum state); State v. Prince, 132 P.2d 146, 149 (Idaho 1942) (prior
felony conviction in sister state need not be offense defined as felony in forum state). The
wording of their statutes was in each case determinative. Compare COLO. REv. STAT. § 1613-101 (1978 & Supp. 1980) (prior conviction "either in this state or elsewhere of a felony, or
under the laws of any other state ....
") and IDAHO CODE § 19-2514 (1979) (prior conviction "whether had within the state of Idaho or was had without the state of Idaho ....
")
with N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-5 (1972) (prior conviction " . . . within this state of a felony, or under the laws of any other government . . . , of a crime . . . which if committed
within this state would be a felony") and OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 21, § 54 (West 1958) ("con-

victed in any other state ... of an offense which, if committed within this state, would be
punishable by the laws of this state by imprisonment in a penitentiary").
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